ABSTRACT: Rampant inflation, widespread economic recession, and large balance of payments deficits pose paramount problems everywhere. The current inflation has been fed by a combination of demand-pull and cost-push forces whose effects were aggravated by the confluence of special factors worldwide in scope. Buoyant economic activity and excess demand were the dominant inflationary forces from mid-1972 through October, 1973. Energy shortage and a speculative boom in commodity prices contributed most to the inflationary pressures in the intervening period through May, 197 4.
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Since then wage and price adjustments have been playing crucial roles in the inflationary situation. To a great extent solution of these problems requires concerted international action extending to (1) pursuance of domestic economic policies; (2) formulation of joint energy, finance, and trade policies;
(3) stimulation of production; and (4) strengthening competition. It will also be necessary to reconcile the imperatives of restraining inflation and stimulating economic activity.
THE UNPRECEDENTED SPATE OF THE 1973-74 U.S. INFLA tion was fueled by a combination of factors, including past and current economic policies and a number of spe cial events resulting in commodity shortages. Some of the inflationary forces at work were of domestic origin, whereas others were global in scope.
Inflationary Buildup
While our current inflationary situation stems from many causes, expansive monetary and fiscal policies of earlier years are important among them. They still have not fully run their course. Since the mid-1960's a sub stantial part of inflationary pressure came from acceler ating federal spending that boosted aggregate demand for goods and services, but added little to the economy's capacity to produce. The last time the budget showed a surplus was in fiscal year 1969 (Table 1) . Budget deficit in fiscal 1973-74 was $5.6 billion, rather modest when compared with the deficits of the three preceding fiscal years. 1 The bulk of deficits of the past decade arose from the unwillingness of governments to finance the Vietnam war and expanded social programs through adequate taxation. The financing of these large federal deficits by monetary and credit expansion have also been contribut ing to the upward pressures on interest rates.2 What all this boils down to is that the government was competing with the private sector for scarce resources and credit, causing aggregate demand to expand more rapidly than the economy's capacity to meet it.
Special factors were the dominant inflationary forces during 1973. Buoyant economic activity at home and S. C. Schmidt is professor of agricultural marketing and policy.
26 abroad led to a bidding up of prices everywhere. Capac ity utilization in major material-producing industries such as steel, paper, cement, machinery, many chemicals, and most nonferrous metals aggravated pressures on prices.3 Worldwide shortfalls in agricultural production in 1972 together with the Arab oil embargo and subse quent price hikes were additional powerful inflationary forces. Indeed, food and fuels accounted for nearly half the increase in consumer prices from mid-1 9 73 to mid-1974. Nor is that all. A special source of inflationary buying has been speculative stockpiling on the part of importers in anticipation of still further price rises. Contributing to this buying spree has been the shifting by speculators of large sums of money from shaky stocks and foreign currencies into a buoyant and rising commodities market.
Furthermore, the wage-price control program itself was instrumental in intensifying economic distortions and bottleneck shortages. Controls which held prices below levels that would have been set by demand and supply made it uneconomical for firms to increase capacity.
Controls failed to restrain fuel, food (especially meat), and fertilizer prices when demand outgrew available sup plies in 1973. The rise in fuel costs obviously could not be prevented because oil prices were set by foreign gov-' But when off-budget outlays and expenditures of govern mentally sponsored agencies are included, the total federal deficit reached $ 2 1 billion last year.
2 From 1970 through 1974, the public debt, including obliga tions of the federal credit agencies, has risen by more than $ 100 billion.
8 Between the third quarter of 1973 and second quarter of 1974, the ratio of output to plant capacity for major materials reached 90 to 94 percent. See Federal Reserve Bulletin, 60 (9) : 6 17 (September, 1974) .
ernments. In the case of fertilizer and other commodities, with domestic prices lower than foreign prices, domestic producers found it profitable to expand exports at the expense of domestic sales.4
The overall decline since early 1971 in the exchange value of the dollar relative to other currencies imparted a new dimension to our inflationary problem. It contrib uted in two significan t ways to accelerating U.S. infla tion: first, by raising the dollar prices of imported goods and of those products that were based on imported materials. And, second, in making American goods cheaper in terms of foreign currencies, the depreciation of the dollar stimulated U . S . exports, putting further pressure on our already strained supplies.
Price and Economic Development in 1974
Price trends. Prices today are still in the grip of some of the fundamental forces operating this past year. But while world-induced food and fuel inflationary forces are decelerating, the tide of price hikes generated by domes tic forces keeps right on rolling and is apt to last longer. Food and energy-related items and services led the rise in prices. Oil price increases have both direct and indi rect effects on the general price level. Direct effects are reflected in the increased cost of energy. Indirect effects occur when these higher energy costs become incorpo-' For example, a 35-percent average spread between export and domestic prices in 1973 induced such large exports that domestic fertilizer requirements could not be fully met.
rated into the price of oil-based products such as chemi cals, plastics, and other goods and services. 5
Part of the rise in prices is attributable to increases in stituted following the termination of wage and price con trols on May 1 . With the lid off everything but the oil industry, pressures for price hikes showed up in many directions. For a number of industries and their products (nonferrous metals and their alloys, most petrochemical materials, fertilizer, paper, aluminum, and petrochemical products) which were earlier freed from control, the lifting of controls has not had much immediate impact on their prices. Prices were hiked promptly, first of all to recover the pent-up costs incurred during price controls and higher material costs. Largest increases occurred in metals (copper, aluminum, lead, tin, and zinc) where controls had held domestic prices below those in world markets. In other fields, prices were marked up for steel and related products, health services, utilities, newsprint, clothing, and home furnishings. In the automobile in dustry, each maker raised prices several times on 1 974 models. At the wholesale level, December price trends show mixed patterns, with decreases slightly outweighing increases. Since September, there have been renewed up ward pressures on food prices generated mainly by grains 66  65  71  89  89  93  107  105  110  107  105  116  115  114  124  126  125  132  123  122  131  125  124  132  127  126  132  127  127  132   125  125  129  125  124  128  125  125  128  125  125  128  126  126  130  126  126  130  126  125  130  125  125  130  126  125  129  125  125  129  122  122 Buying resistance on the part of consumers has developed chiefly because inflation has eroded the purchasing power not only of their income but also of their wealth.9
Outlook for 1975 and Beyond
Factors affecting the course of the economy. Price increases will continue to be large. Conceivably, the course of inflation in the months ahead will be affected by ( 1) the pace of economic activity, both here and abroad; (2) availability and cost of energy and raw ma terials; ( 3) consumer spending; ( 4) the size of wage adjustments; ( 5) expectations regarding future price trends; (6) government economic policies; and ( 7) level of exports. Some elaboration on the effect and probable course of these economic factors follows.
U.S. economic outlook. Leading economic indicators
show mixed signs adding up to a feeling of uncertainty regarding the timing and extent of the hoped-for re bound. Complicating the picture is that the indicators themselves are influenced by inflation . When the effect of rising prices is removed, the gain in profits and busi ness investment is much smaller.10 U.S. manufacturing 'Survey of Current Business 54(10 ) :5. October, 1974.
• In real terms, only durable manufacturing and farm stocks increased significantly.
•Real disposable personal income has fallen 8, 4.5, 0.4 and 4.4 percent in the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 1974.
'0 Profit figures need to be adjusted to make allowance for the 12 Federal financial aids to the housing industry include (a) permitting the FHA and VA to guarantee home mortgages up to $45,000; (b) permitting agencies that purchase home mort gages under federal programs to go up to $55,000 ; and ( c) raising home-improvement loans insured by the FHA to $10,000. and restrictive mortgage terms make prospects for an early recovery in home-construction dim.
Wage adjustments. The size and pace of wage raises remains a matter of uncertainty. Indications of hefty wage increases to offset last year's rise in living costs, and perhaps to beat possible wage controls by mid-1975, are showing up in many directions. Given inflation's pace during the past year, wage increases have to go above 10 percent a year just to enable workers to keep up with living costs.13 As a result, some experts predict a signifi cant step-up in wage and benefit settlements for some 2.5 million workers whose contracts expire in 1975.14 In deed, while new agreements concluded immediately after controls were lifted (April, 1974) raised wages and fringe benefits by an average of 7 percent, by fall raises aver aged 12 percent. There are reports that in some unions workers are pressing for renegotiation of wage agree ments ahead of scheduled expiration. Such trends may portend wage demands in excess of productivity ad vances, setting off a new round of price increases that could inflate production costs and commodity prices for the next three years. Yet it is also true that until pay increases catch up with, and overtake, the rate at which prices are increasing, consumer spending will remain a drag on recovery. Inflation expectations. The expectation of inflation in the future is something that influences spending habits and investment decisions. Widespread fear that inflation will continue unabated for years to come, for example, could prompt lenders to raise interest rates, labor unions to push for more wages, and businessmen to make specu lative inventory purchases. The danger is that once infla tionary expectations develop, they tend to be self-per petuating.
Some people, uncertain about jobs and about making ends meet, may try to save for future difficult times and are delaying purchase of consumer durables which tend to be postponable. Others, who fear that prices will never be lower, will try to protect themselves by buying any thing and everything. Favoring spending, however, is that inflation reduces the real value of savings, insur ance, and pensions.
No doubt inflation psychology accounts for some of the "The controls program contained wage increases in 1973, with average contract settlements staying within or close to the 5.5-percent pay standard adopted by the government.
"Major areas to be affected are railroads, construction, oil refineries, shipping, and Postal Service.
15 This refers to situations involving 1,000 or more workers.
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1974 business inventory buildups after inventories had been below desired levels during the previous year. Also some firms are stepping up loan demands in the belief that, with continued inflation, the financing of new plants and equipment will cost more later than it does now. Basically, there is a widely held view among bor rowers that one always gains by repaying loans in infla tion-cheapened dollars.
Interest rates, credit, and inflation. It should be recog nized that inflation, monetary expansion, and interest rates are intimately connected, with the last two being both causes and effects of inflation. Our experience over long periods of time bears testimony to a broad rela tionship between trends in money expansion and the be havior of prices and pattern of inflation. These relation ships need no elaboration here. The association between inflation and interest rates is also well known and reflects lenders' concern to protect the real value of debt instru ments. In times of rising prices lenders demand an infla tionary premium in terms of higher interest rates.
Monetary experts suggest that a rule of thumb in U.S. money markets is that the real interest on loans is be tween 2 and 3 percent; thus, the actual rate charged is 2 to 3 percent plus whatever lenders expect the rate of inflation to be.
Inflation tends to boost the demand for credit for a number of reasons. First, credit needs of business firms are increased by inflated operating costs, notwithstanding record-high interest costs, for it takes about 12 percent more money now to transact the same business as in the corresponding period of 19 73. The growing demand for credit also reflects the efforts of many firms to replenish inventories and to increase capital investments, but pru dence was not the whole story. Rapidly rising commod ity prices, along with the unsettled state of commodity markets, have encouraged speculation, often financed in the money markets. With the demand for credit growing more rapidly than the supply, interest rates have risen to record levels. In addition, the Federal Reserve System has had to bear the brunt of the battle against inflation by raising interest rates and keeping credit tight.
U.S. interest rates today also reflect conditions in money and capital markets abroad. Most developed countries now allow the free international movement of substantial capital sums and this helps to transmit rapidly any changes in financial conditions among industrial countries. Also, in the course of this process, capital flows can exert an equalizing effect on interest rate structures.
We must bear in mind, however, that the international flow of funds attracted by interest rate disparities can have a de-stabilizing effect on national financial markets and reduce the effectiveness of anti-inflationary policies. The prime lending rate, the rate commercial banks charge on short-term loans to their most credit-worthy business borrowers, reached a record 1 2 percent in July, 1 974. The rates were lowered in successive steps since October and by the last week of January were down to 9.25 to 9.5 percent, the lowest since last May. The lower prime rates stem from the Federal Reserve Board's easing of its previous restrictions on the money supply to stimulate business.16 The money stock rose at a 7-percent annual rate in November, compared to a 2.2 percent rate of growth over the preceding four months.
There is no clear indication of the prospective trend in U.S. interest rates. The future level of interest rates will certainly be tied to the pace of inflation, rate of money and credit growth, and interest rates abroad. The Fed eral Reserve Board is likely to relax the credit squeeze a bit should there be (a) an easing of inflation; (b) a weakening demand for financial inventory buildups; ( c) curtailment of business investment; and (d) a serious threat to the solvency of many credit-dependent firms.
Lagging or declining retail sales, for example, would throw a damper on inventory buildups. For any of the above reasons interest rates could come down to more normal levels, perhaps to around 8 to 9 percent by mid-1 9 75. And, conversely, interest rates could rise again should inflation continue unabated.
Level of exports. World demand for U.S. agricultural products will be affected by the size of balance of pay ments deficits, exchange-rate variations, rate of inflation, and economic growth. Energy price increases have a large and pervasive impact on all these trade-affecting factors. Recycling can only be a short-term solution to the massive balance of payments problems of oil-import ing nations, since oil exporters do not seem prepared to extend loans or make investments indefinitely . To im prove their balance of payments deficits, nations will try to increase their own exports, curb oil and food imports, and cut energy use. 
Whither the U.S. Economy?
General economic situation. Real GNP for all of 1 974 is estimated to be down about 2 . 2 percent from 1 973. I t is forecast to keep slipping until mid-1 975, followed by only a weak recovery should present tight policies prevail. Significant economic revival may not occur un til late 1 9 75 or early 1 976. Although capital investment by U.S. business is expected to rise 1 2 percent in 1 9 75, in real terms it probably will not rise at all. Under these circumstances, the rise in the unemployment rate now underway is likely to continue. It may reach about 7 .5 percent of the work force by spring and might soar to 8 percent by the end of 1 975 .
••The Federal Reserve Board announced January 3, 1975, it had granted permission for six of its district banks to lower their discount rate (the rate they charge for loans to commercial banks ) to 7.25 percent from 7.75 percent. The action lowered the rates at the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Richmond, Cleveland, Dallas, and San Francisco. The six other district banks are expected to ask that they be cleared to cut their discount rate to 7.25 percent also. See Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1975, p. 3.
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There is considerable pent-up demand for housing, cars, and other durables that should eventually help the economy turn around. Spurred by federal housing aid, real residential investment may revive by mid-1 975 . Con sumer spending, however, will remain weak through 1 9 75 because of the high level of unemployment and contin ued inflation that reduces real personal incomes.
Inflation outloo k in the industrial sector. December price statistics confirm a continuation of steep inflation. The prospects for a slowdown in the pace of inflation in 1 9 75 are fading. While demand will be pulling prices up less strongly, shortages in some industrial materials and foods, together with increases in wages and benefits, are likely to result in more cost increases. Continued sluggish ness of economic activity, both here and abroad, however, would keep a damper on demand for industrial raw ma terials and capital goods, and thereby could moderate the rate of price inflation. Also there is evidence that business inventories have reached normal levels and therefore no significant further accumulation can be ex pected in the near future. Oil prices, apparently, have been stabilized for six months, or until June 1 , 1 975. A possible weakening in oil prices might be brought about by joint energy-saving measures instituted by the con suming nations and the oil-exporting nation's self-interest in not wanting to cause major economic and political up heavels in industrial countries. Even so, higher costs are in prospect for electricity and natural gas, and increased prices for coal. The coal strike settlement of December, 1 9 74, will bear heavily on economic activity by raising the cost of energy for industry and public utilities.17
A possible decontrol of oil prices would also contribute to the speedup of inflation.18 Additional rises in prices of housing, clothing, utilities, and medical care are coming in 1 9 75. Railroad freight rates and air fares might be boosted again. Prices of industrial raw materials will show a mixed and unstable pattern. Considering the notorious volatility of industrial raw material markets, price move ments reverse themselves easily notwithstanding business conditions. Moreover, oil dollars may well flow into com modities as a hedge against inflation and erosion of the value of foreign currencies. Such moves could help prop up commodity prices.
Overall, the prospect is for continued rapid inflation with prices rising at about current rates in the months ahead. The rate of inflation is predicted to slow to be tween 8 and 9 percent in mid-1 9 75, down from about 1 2 percent i n 1 974.
Farm and Food Prices
Farm prices. Both farm and food prices are in a state of flux and one cannot at this time be sure about their 11 Coal, for example, generates nearly half of all the electricity produced in the United States and it fuels most steel mills.
••Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act the Admin istration placed a ceiling of $5.25 a barrel on crude produced in the United States from existing wells. Crude from newly devel oped wells and low-output, or so-called stripper wells, is not controlled, and neither is the price of imported crude. Prices refiners charge must be based on the average cost of their crude. course in months ahead. Farm prices during the current marketing year will likely be shaped by the tightness of grain supplies (including low carryover stocks), rate of grain feeding, and world market conditions. Rain-de layed plantings, the subsequent drouth, and September frosts sharply reduced anticipated feed grain and soy bean production. According to January USDA ap praisals, total feed grain production is estimated at 1 50 million metric tons, down nearly 20 percent from the 1 9 7 3 harves t. Of this, com production represents about 1 1 6.8 million tons ( 4.6 billion bushels) and sorghum 1 7.0 million tons ( 628 million bushels). 19 At these output levels the corn crop would be 1 8 percent below 1 973 and sorghum about 32 percent. By contrast, the 1 974-75 wheat crop is estimated at a record 48.8 million tons
( 1, 793 million bushels), 5 percent above last year's out put. 20 Soybean production was estimated at 1 . 23 billion bushels, or nearly 20 percent below the 1 973 record.
Reduced feed grain and soybean supplies and atten dant high prices have led to uncertainty in the outlook for livestock and meat prices and consequently food prices. There is much evidence that producers are liqui dating livestock inventories in response to declining live stock-price ratios.21 The resultant record beef supplies, large pork stocks, and ample turkey supplies are keeping a damper on prices for the present.
According to November reports, farmers intend in 1 9 75 to reduce the number of cattle in feedlots by 1 9 percent; broiler production by 1 0 percent; egg produc tion by 5 percent; and hog production by around 1 0 per cent. If they materialize, the smaller supplies suggest stronger prices for hogs, pork, and broilers in the first half of 1 975. Only supplies of beef which has received little or no grain fattening are expected to be larger in 1 975 than in 1 9 74. This will mean a record beef produc tion and consumption in 1 975. The expected record stems from the overbuilding of herds during recent years and prevailing cost-price squeeze that makes feeding un economic. Long-run beef supplies, however, will likely be adversely affected as producers are reducing the size of breeding herds. Dairy farmers and egg producers faced also with a severe cost-price squeeze are expected to feed less grain and concentrates. In turn, milk and egg pro duction are expected to drop below 1 973 levels and their prices will probably rise. An exception might be manu factured dairy products, where large stocks could dampen a rise in manufacturing milk prices.
On the whole, a combination of tight supplies, re duced livestock production, and the shifting from inten sive concentrate feeding of cattle to grass and roughage feeding are curtailing domestic usage of grains, oilseed 21 The Omaha beef steer-corn price ratio in October was 10.7 compared to previous favorable range of 20 to 25; the hog-corn ratio in October was I 0.8 compared to the earlier range of 15 to 20 · the milk-feed ratio dropped from the 1973 average of 1.47 t6 1.2; the mid-September broiler-feed price ratio was 2.6; and the egg-feed ratio was 6.7.
3 2 meals, and cakes. According t o USDA estimates, domes tic use of feed grains in 1 974-75 will fall to 1 1 4.8 million metric tons, down a fifth from the 1 973-74 level. Of this, corn is estimated to supply 88.3 million tons. 22 Because of high prices and smaller livestock and poultry numbers, domestic disappearance of soybean meal is forecast to fall by about 5 percent below the record 1 2.6 million tons used in 1973-74.
It appears that domestic use of wheat will drop off sharply from 1 973-74 levels, mainly because of reduced feeding. High wheat prices relative to principal feed grain prices have slowed wheat feeding in 1 974, a trend that is likely to continue through the current marketing season. The outlook for 1 9 74-75 is a wheat-feeding level of between 2 and 3 .4 million tons compared with 3.9 million a year earlier. 23
Export prospects. The volume of exports in the pres ent tight supply situation has a direct bearing on inflation and the price of food in the United States. Clearly, the more food that is exported or extended as aid, the higher domestic food prices are likely to be. As of the beginning of 1 975, the size of exports is still a major unknown.
Foreign consumption of grains and soybeans is affected by much the same factors as those tending to limit U.S . consumption. Decline in real personal disposable income, unfavorable livestock-feed price ratios, and oil-induced foreign exchange shortages will be the major use and purchase deterrents.
In view of current world economic conditions and larger Southern Hemisphere grain supplies, it is unlikely that U.S. corn and soybean exports will reach the levels of the past two years. 24 A generally weak livestock econ omy and a record grain crop of its own should reduce the European Community's demand for U.S. wheat and feed grains, notably corn . In addition, more wheat is going to be fed (used in hog rations) because current prices favor wheat over corn and thus cut back the need for corn. Among other major importers Japan, the USSR, and Communist China are expected to reduce their purchases of U.S. feed grains from 1 973-74 levels.
After paying for oil imports -up from $3. 7 billion in 1 9 7 2 to around $ 1 5 billion in 1 9 74-the developing According to USDA outlook specialists, farmers expect to cultivate 1 2 to 16 million more acres in 1 9 75 than in 1 9 74, almost two-thirds of it in corn and other feed grains. Acreage planted to wheat in 1 975 could increase moderately over 1 9 74's 7 1 million acres. Given more normal weather conditions, a crop of 2. 1 billion bushels or more could be harvested. This would provide enough wheat to meet both home and foreign demand in 1 9 75-76, as well as to allow reserve stocks to be rebuilt. With good weather, feed grain and soybean production could be large enough to significantly slow price increases. 
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Beyond 1975. Turning to the outlook for the more dis tant future, all signs suggest that the task of bringing inflation under control is likely to be protracted. Infla tion, together with high-cost energy, will remain for some time the nation's chief economic and political prob lems. Some analysts are predicting inflation in the range of 5 to 6 percent per year for the foreseeable future. On the optimistic side is that current investment in modem plants improves efficiency and thus reduces costs. Fur thermore, increased production from new plants will re duce the risk of future shortages and hold down prices later on. Hopefully, competitive forces will come into play and help bring about restraint on further increases.
There is general agreement that lasting progress against inflation can be achieved only by increasing supplies of goods and services and by curbing excessive demand. We can no longer comfort ourselves with the thought that these adjustments will take place automatically and in flation will slow down by itself. There is by now a great deal of inflation built into our system, as well as in that of every major nation around the world, so that only energetic government measures can counteract the in flationary forces. Making matters worse in this respect is that governments everywhere appear reluctant to adopt austerity measures that would cool off domestic demand until the inflationary pace becomes politically unaccept able. The federal budget provides the most powerful tool for controlling aggregate spending and demand. Basically spending should be held down and taxes raised when the economy is overheated and, conversely, spending should be increased when the economy is slack and demand for goods needs to be stimulated. A budget surplus or a bal anced budget entails less government borrowing and hence can be helpful in bringing down interest rates. A budget surplus might be achieved by a combination of 28 These proposals call for ( 1 ) a one-time $ 1 6 billion tax cut, $ 1 2 billion to individuals and $4 billion to corporations ; ( 2) higher taxes and tariffs on imported and domestic crude oil, natural gas, and imported petroleum products; ( 3) an increase of $2 billion for state and local governments ; ( 4) direct federal payment of $80 a year to each adult earning too little to pay income taxes ; and (5) a 5-percent limit for 1 975 on federal pay raises.
2• Transfer payments include Social Security, welfare aid to the aged, food stamps, medicare, veteran's compensation, and government retirement benefits.
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The third strategy proposed against both inflation and economic slowdown is a program of controls. It advocates the development of a comprehensive program of control over management and labor in setting prices and wage controls. This might include the modification of antitrust laws to encourage more competition. Aiding the anti inflationary efforts would be the development of an en ergy policy that encourages energy conservation and greater production of energy from domestic sources.
Trade liberalization, the reduction of tariffs, and non tariff measures, too, can be helpful in countering price mcreases.
Summary Comments
The present combination of stagnant and slipping in dustrial production and virulent inflation indicate that the economy is in the grip of an unprecedented stagfla tion with no clear turning point in sight. The labor market has weakened in the fall of 1 974 as the unem ployment rate rose from 5.4 percent in August to 7 . 1 percent i n December, the highest level since 1 96 1 , a recession year. The current accelerating rise in wages and salaries will exert continued pressure on costs in 1 975 as labor unions strive for increases to recoup lost purchas ing power and overtake anticipated rises in consumer prices. Thus, there is little prospect for a significant tam ing of inflation. However, the worst of inflation may be over. Slack demand and some weakening in commodity prices should help slow the rate of inflation. Compli cating remedial government action is that a vigorous use of either anti-inflationary or anti-recessionary measures would make the other affliction worse. That is fiscal and monetary restraints are not only slowing down inflation, but also contribute to the deceleration of economic ac tivity. In the present economic situation many people think that depression is as serious a danger as inflation.
Indications are that public concern is shifting away from the need for curbing inflation to counter depression. Con sequently, a more expansionary fiscal policy may be in the offing. Whether monetary policy will be eased further is open to question.
Looking ahead, it would appear that food will be a major problem in 1 975 and even beyond. Short supplies of feed grains and soybeans will tend to hold prices up in 1 975, in spite of reduced domestic consumption and exports. Prices will likely continue to show wide and erratic swings because of low carryover stocks. Domestic usage of feed grains in 1 975 is forecast to fall a fifth below last year and that of oilseed meals by 7 percent, reflecting sizable reductions in animal and poultry num bers and feeding rates. In response to high feed costs there have been dramatic adjustments in feeding prac tices. Many of the cattle now being slaughtered received little or no grain fattening. Higher feed and operating costs and cutbacks in production other than for beef should raise pork, poultry, and dairy product prices through much of the first half of 1 975. Larger beef sup plies, however, should supplement total supplies of retail meat and exert a moderating influence on prices. But now the obvious question is, "How will consumers react when the higher meat and livestock product prices hit the retail market shelves?" Because of inflation and pos sibly no gain or even a loss of consumer buying power and a high rate of unemployment, consumers may well cut back once again on their meat and livestock product purchases.
World conditions point to smaller U.S. wheat, feed grain, and soybean exports in 1 974-75 than in the past two seasons. Even so, their volume will still be signifi cantly greater than the level of shipments made in the ILLINOIS AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS -JANUARY, 1975 1 972-73 period. On balance, reduced exports will have a slowing effect on price increases. Wheat prices will be shaped largely by the volume of exports and world wheat supplies. With a 4-percent smaller 1 974-75 world wheat crop and low carryover stocks, wheat prices both at home and abroad should continue high and average above last year's level.
Although world stocks will be very low to start the 1 975-76 season, production is likely to be more plentiful than in 1 973-74. This would help ease the price pressures, but that is up to nature.
